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APPLYING MICHIGAN V. SUMMERS TO
OFF-PREMISES SEIZURES: THE “AS EARLY
AS PRACTICABLE” STANDARD
DAVID TORREBLANCA†
INTRODUCTION
Police officers are waiting outside of the house of a suspected
drug dealer, preparing to execute a search warrant for drugs and
firearms that the officers have probable cause to believe are in
the home. Just before the police approach the premises, they
observe the suspected drug dealer leave his house and head to
his car. The police know that they may detain the occupant
before he leaves his property, but they fear that their swift
approach might cause the possibly armed suspect to retaliate,
flee, or retreat to his house to destroy the drugs, or that other
occupants of the home might react violently or dispose of the
drugs. Instead of rushing the suspect and endangering his and
their safety, the police pull him over outside of the view of his
home, detain him, and bring him back to the house.
Before the police search his home, the occupant consents to a
search of his person. The search of the occupant yields a gun and
ten grams of methamphetamine. The officers then search his
house, but find no other contraband.
The occupant was
apparently attempting to sell the methamphetamine, but was
interrupted when the police detained him. The police are not
worried, however, since the occupant’s possession of over five
grams of methamphetamine carries a mandatory sentence of at
least five years in prison and four years of supervised release.1
Fortunately for the suspect, and unfortunately for his
community, he goes to trial in a district court in the Tenth
Circuit. The judge rules that the police illegally arrested the

†
Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2013, St. John’s University
School of Law; B.A., 2009, Providence College.
1
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii) (2012).
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suspect when they detained him, since he had already left his
premises.2 The judge acknowledges that the police could have
seized the suspect while he was still on his property without
violating his Fourth Amendment rights,3 but holds that the
suspect’s
off-premises
detention
was
impermissible.4
Consequently, the judge rules that the methamphetamine and
gun the officers obtained from their unconstitutional seizure and
search of the suspect are “fruit of the poisonous tree” and cannot
be used as evidence against the suspect.5 If the officers had
rushed to detain the suspect before he drove away from his
property, risking their and the suspect’s safety and chancing the
destruction of the drugs, the seizure would have been reasonable
and the evidence obtained from the suspect would have been
admissible.6 Since the officers waited until the occupant left his
premises before detaining him, however, the detainment is an
illegal arrest,7 the contraband is inadmissible in evidence,8 and
the drug dealer likely goes free.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the “right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”9 It protects an individual’s
property, including his person, against a “seizure”: a “meaningful
interference with an individual’s possessory interests in [his or
her] property.”10 A person is seized when an officer, “by means of
physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains his
freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.”11

2

See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 93–94 (10th Cir. 1996).
See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (“Thus, for Fourth
Amendment purposes, we hold that a warrant to search for contraband founded on
probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the
occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” (footnote omitted)).
4
See, e.g., Edwards, 103 F.3d at 93–94.
5
See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963) (holding
that evidence obtained as a direct consequence of an illegal arrest must be
suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree”).
6
See Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 (ruling that the occupant’s arrest and the
search incident thereto were constitutionally permissible since it was lawful for
police to detain the occupant while they executed a search warrant on his property).
7
See, e.g., Edwards, 103 F.3d at 94.
8
See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488.
9
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
11
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
3
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Reasonable seizures, those supported by adequate cause, are
constitutionally permissible, since officers must seize an
individual “unreasonabl[y]” to violate his or her Fourth
Amendment rights.12 In the case of an arrest, which is one form
of “seizure” of a person, police need “probable cause.”13 Where an
arrest is made in a home, police usually need an arrest warrant
in addition to probable cause.14
There are some situations, however, where police may seize
a person incident to other circumstances with less than probable
cause. For example, in Michigan v. Summers,15 the Supreme
Court held that a warrant to search for contraband on premises
carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of
those premises while the warrant is executed.16 The Court found
that the police seized the occupant by detaining him while he was
on his front steps, but ruled that the seizure was reasonable and
did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights.17 Since Summers,
however, the circuits have split on whether police may detain an
occupant of premises subject to a search warrant when the
occupant leaves the premises immediately before the warrant is
executed.18
This Note argues that the correct standard for determining
whether the off-premises seizure of an occupant of property
subject to a search is reasonable is whether the police detained
the occupant as soon as practicable. Unlike the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits, which have ruled that the Summers holding does
not apply after the occupant leaves the premises,19 this Note
contends that drawing a bright line at the residence’s curb serves
no practical purpose and creates more problems than it prevents.
Rather, this Note asserts that the same policies that guided the
Supreme Court’s decision in Summers are at stake even after an
occupant leaves his or her premises and that Summers should
apply when officers detain the occupant as soon as practicable

12

U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting against “unreasonable” seizures).
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
14
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980).
15
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
16
Id. at 705.
17
Id. at 694, 696, 705.
18
See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 2011) (discussing
the circuit split), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013).
19
See United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 94 (10th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Sherrill, 27 F.3d 344, 346 (8th Cir. 1994).
13
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after observing the occupant leave his property. Further, this
Note proposes three factors for courts to consider in evaluating
whether police detained the occupant as soon as practicable: the
distance the occupant traveled prior to his seizure, the time that
elapsed between his departure and his detention, and evidence
that police exploited the seizure.
Part I provides an overview of the Fourth Amendment’s
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, first
discussing general Fourth Amendment principles, then analyzing
the Supreme Court’s Summers decision. Part II addresses the
circuit split over extending Summers where the occupant of the
premises has left the property. Part II discusses the approaches
taken by the four circuits that have applied, and the two circuits
that have declined to apply, Summers to off-premises
detainments.
Part III argues that the circuits that have
extended Summers where officers have detained occupants off
premises are correct. It asserts that such detainments are
reasonable seizures so long as the officers detained the occupants
as soon as practicable after observing the occupants leave the
property, and it provides guidelines for applying this test. Part
III further contends that the policies underlying the Fourth
Amendment and the Summers decision support that result.
Finally, Part IV addresses the Supreme Court’s recent decision
rejecting the “as soon as practicable” standard and articulates
why the Court’s approach falls short and needs to be revisited.
I.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S BAN AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

This Part discusses the Fourth Amendment’s protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Part I.A provides a
brief overview of the government abuses that the Fourth
Amendment was enacted to prevent and addresses how the
Supreme Court has applied the Fourth Amendment in different
contexts. Part II.B delves into the Supreme Court’s decision in
Michigan v. Summers, analyzing the policies and interests that
guided the Court in holding that a search warrant carries with it
the authority to detain the occupants of the premises being
searched.
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The Fourth Amendment’s Varied Standards of Protection

The framers of the Constitution adopted the Fourth
Amendment, in large part, to combat the government’s issuance
of “writs of assistance” and “general warrants,” devices that
empowered law enforcement to arbitrarily search and seize
people and property.20 The Fourth Amendment restricts, rather
than abolishes, the power of law enforcement to search and seize
by condemning only “unreasonable” searches and seizures.21 The
Amendment, which consists of two clauses, does not require a
warrant for every search or seizure.22 Instead, it requires that
warrants be issued only upon probable cause.23 Therefore, a
search or seizure may be reasonable and constitutional without a
warrant, but “writs of assistance” and “general warrants” are
still prohibited by the requirement that a warrant be supported
by probable cause.24
The extent to which the Fourth Amendment protects people
and property against arbitrary searches and seizures varies
depending on the circumstances.
Officers must establish
probable cause before a court issues a warrant: Probable cause
exists when the facts and circumstances within an officer’s
personal knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of
reasonable caution to believe that, in the case of a search, a
particularly described item subject to seizure will be found in the
place to be searched, and in the case of an arrest, an offense has
been committed by the person to be arrested.25 However, a
warrant may not be required. While the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Fourth Amendment to generally require not just
probable cause, but a search warrant, to validate the search of a
20

See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624–26 (1886). General warrants
“authorized searches in any place, for any thing.” Id. at 641 (Miller, J., concurring).
Writs of assistance were issued on executive authority and gave extensive power to
the King’s agents to search at will for smuggled goods. United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977).
21
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 641.
22
The first clause of the Fourth Amendment states that “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,” and the second declares
that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
23
Id.
24
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 641.
25
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949).
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home,26 police may search an automobile with probable cause
alone.27 Similarly, a seizure in a home that amounts to an arrest
requires an arrest warrant supported by probable cause,28 while
an arrest in public requires probable cause, but not an arrest
warrant.29
Although the official seizure of a person generally must be
supported by probable cause even where no formal arrest is
made,30 there are also situations where police need neither a
warrant nor probable cause before they may seize an individual.
For instance, in Terry v. Ohio,31 the Supreme Court ruled that
reasonable suspicion that an individual has committed or is
about to commit a crime justifies a limited investigatory search
and seizure, but not an arrest, of that individual, despite a lack of
probable cause.32 “Reasonable suspicion” is a lower standard
than probable cause, and requires “a minimal level of objective
justification for making [a] stop.”33 Additionally, police do not
need probable cause or a warrant to seize the occupant of
premises that are subject to a search warrant.34
B.

Michigan v. Summers: Seizures Justified by Search Warrants

In Michigan v. Summers, the Supreme Court established a
bright-line rule that “for Fourth Amendment purposes, . . . a
warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause
implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the
occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.”35
In Summers, police officers were preparing to execute a search
warrant for narcotics on the defendant’s premises when the

26
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“Any assumption that
evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a
search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would
reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people’s homes secure only in the
discretion of police officers.”).
27
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982) (holding that a search
warrant is not required for police to search an automobile where the search is based
on probable cause).
28
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980).
29
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
30
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 211 n.14, 212 (1979).
31
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
32
Id. at 20–22.
33
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).
34
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981).
35
Id. (citations omitted).
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defendant started to descend his front steps.36 The police
requested the defendant’s assistance in entering the house and
detained him while they searched it.37 After the officers found
narcotics in the home, they arrested the defendant, searched his
person, and found an additional 8.5 grams of heroin on him.38
The defendant, charged with possession of the heroin found on
his person, moved to suppress the heroin as a product of an
illegal search in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.39 The
trial court suppressed the evidence, and both the Michigan Court
of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed.40 The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that it was
lawful for the police to seize the defendant and require him to reenter his home and remain there until they gathered evidence
that established probable cause.41 Accordingly, once probable
cause to arrest the defendant was established, his arrest and the
search that followed it were constitutionally permitted.42
The Summers Court based its decision on the limited
intrusiveness of the seizure and the important law enforcement
interests at stake in such a case.43 The Court first addressed the
seizure’s limited invasiveness, concluding that the defendant’s
detention was “substantially less intrusive” than an arrest.44 The
Court stressed that the police had obtained a warrant to search
the defendant’s house for contraband.45 A neutral and detached
magistrate determined that there was probable cause to believe
that a crime was being committed in the house and authorized
the police to substantially invade the privacy of the people
residing there.46 The Court remarked that “[t]he detention of one
of the residents while the premises were searched, although

36

Id. at 693.
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 694.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 705–06.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 699 (stating that some “seizures admittedly covered by the Fourth
Amendment constitute such limited intrusions on the personal security of those
detained and are justified by such substantial law enforcement interests that they
may be made on less than probable cause, so long as police have an articulable basis
for suspecting criminal activity”).
44
Id. at 702 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979)).
45
Id. at 701.
46
Id.
37
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admittedly a significant restraint on his liberty, was surely less
intrusive than the search itself.”47 The Court further stated that
most citizens would choose to remain at their homes to observe
the search of their possessions unless they wished to flee to avoid
arrest.48 Additionally, the Court noted that the type of detention
involved was unlikely to be exploited or excessively prolonged by
police since the information that police seek would ordinarily be
obtained by the search of the premises, not the seizure of the
occupant.49 Finally, the Court stated that the detention of the
occupant in his home “could add only minimally to the public
stigma associated with the search itself and would involve
neither the inconvenience nor the indignity associated with a
compelled visit to the police station.”50
The Court next cited four substantial law enforcement
interests that justify detaining an occupant during the execution
of a search warrant. The first and most obvious concern is
preventing the occupant’s flight if incriminating evidence is
discovered.51 Keeping the occupant close by could allow for an
easy arrest without the need for a chase, provided that the search
establishes probable cause.52 The second and more important
interest is in minimizing the risk of harm to the occupants and
the police.53 The Court noted that the facts in Summers revealed
no particular danger to the police, but stated nonetheless that
police can reduce the risk of harm to all involved by “routinely
exercis[ing] unquestioned command of the situation.”54 An
officer’s command of the situation can diminish the threat of
harm especially in the case of a search for narcotics—the type of
situation that is conducive to sudden violence.55 The third
interest identified by the Court concerns an occupant’s panicked
efforts to hide or destroy evidence;56 detaining the occupant
during the search will prevent him from concealing or destroying

47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 702.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 702–03.
Id.
Id. at 702.
Id.
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evidence.57 The final police interest that justifies the seizure of
an individual incident to a search of his home is the facilitation of
the search.58 The police have an interest in completing the
search quickly, and the occupant has an interest in preventing
the destruction of his property by opening doors and containers.59
Given the important police interests at stake and the minimal
“incremental intrusion” on the occupant’s personal liberty
involved, the occupant’s connection to the home subject to a
search “gives the police officer an easily identifiable and certain
basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies
a detention of that occupant.”60
II. THE CIRCUITS’ APPLICATIONS OF SUMMERS TO OFF-PREMISES
DETENTIONS
This Part addresses the circuit split over extending Michigan
v. Summers to off-premises seizures. Part II.A discusses the
balancing approach taken by the Eighth and Tenth Circuits in
refusing to apply Summers where the occupant has left the
premises and the benefits and drawbacks of their approach. Part
II.B analyzes the “as soon as practicable” standard used by the
Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits in extending Summers
to off-premises detainments.
Part II.B also discusses the
arguments for and against that standard.
A.

The Eighth and Tenth Circuits’ Balancing Approach

The Eighth and Tenth Circuits have declined to extend
Michigan v. Summers, which held that a search warrant for
premises allows the police to detain the occupants of the property
during a search,61 where the occupants of the premises have left
the property.62 Those courts held that Summers was inapplicable
because the law enforcement interests that justified the
Summers holding are not at stake after an occupant departs from
his property.63 In United States v. Edwards, the Tenth Circuit
57

See id.
Id. at 703.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 703–04.
61
Id. at 705.
62
United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 94 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Sherrill, 27 F.3d 344, 346 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Thus, we decline the Government’s
invitation to extend Summers to the circumstances of this case.”).
63
Edwards, 103 F.3d at 93–94; Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 346.
58
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opined that “the police’s legitimate law enforcement interest in
preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence was
found was far more attenuated than in Summers,”64 and that
neither the interest in minimizing the risk of harm to officers nor
that of facilitating the orderly completion of the search “were
served in any way by [the defendant’s] extended detention.”65 As
such, the Tenth Circuit held that the defendant’s seizure three
blocks from his home was an illegal arrest.66
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Sherrill,
held that “when the officers stopped [the defendant], the officers
had no interest in preventing flight or minimizing the search’s
risk.”67 That the defendant helped the officers conduct the
search, one of the interests cited by the Summers Court, did not
persuade the Sherrill court to find the detention permissible.68
The Sherrill court gave an additional justification for not
applying Summers, ruling that the intrusiveness of an officer’s
detention of an occupant rises dramatically after the occupant
leaves the premises.69 In Sherrill, immediately before they
executed the search warrant, the police saw the defendant drive
away from his home.70 They stopped him just one block away,
and after the police detained him, he helped the police enter and
conduct the search of his home.71 The court distinguished
Summers, stating that although the minor intrusiveness involved
in detaining an occupant in his home may be outweighed by law
enforcement interests, the situation changes after the occupant
leaves his property.72 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit held that
where the occupant has departed from his premises, the
combination of the greater intrusion on his rights and the
reduced importance of law enforcement interests changes a
would-be reasonable seizure under Summers to an unreasonable
one.73

64

Edwards, 103 F.3d at 93–94.
Id. at 94.
66
Id. at 93–94.
67
Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 346.
68
See id.
69
See id. (“Here, because Sherrill had already exited the premises, the
intrusiveness of the officers’ stop and detention on the street was much greater.”).
70
Id. at 345.
71
Id. at 345–46.
72
See id. at 346.
73
See id.
65
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The Eighth and Tenth Circuits used a balancing test in
determining that the off-premises seizure of an occupant was
unreasonable. The courts weighed the police interests outlined
by the Summers Court—preventing flight, minimizing the risk of
harm to officers and occupants, avoiding the concealment or
destruction of evidence, and facilitating the orderly completion of
the search74—and determined that absent the occupants’
knowledge that their premises were going to be searched, the
officers’ seizures of the occupants were unreasonable.75 The
courts reasoned that an occupant learns of the search and
becomes a risk when police execute a warrant in the occupant’s
presence, but if he is off the property, he will not know of the
search and thus the situation will not implicate any law
enforcement concerns.76
The “intrusiveness of detaining a
resident in his home” cannot be “outweighed by . . . law
enforcement interests” if there are no law enforcement interests
to balance against intrusiveness.77 Accordingly, the balance can
only be shifted where the occupant knows beforehand that his
property is subject to a search warrant.78 Because this situation
is unlikely to arise,79 the Eighth and Tenth Circuits’ approach to
Summers detentions will effectively render Summers
inapplicable where the occupant is detained off premises.
The balancing approach of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits
carries a number of benefits. First, it gives broader Fourth
Since the Fourth Amendment
Amendment protection.80
guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in their persons,

74

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702–03 (1981).
United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 94 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Unlike the
defendant in Summers, who was present where the search warrant was executed,
Edwards did not know—prior to being stopped—that any warrant was being
executed. He thus had no reason to flee.”); Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 346 (holding that the
law enforcement interests at stake in Summers were irrelevant in the present case
“because Sherrill had left the area of the search and was unaware of the warrant”).
76
See Edwards, 103 F.3d at 94; Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 346.
77
See Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 346.
78
See Edwards, 103 F.3d at 93–94; Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 346.
79
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.21 (West 2013) (“A search warrant shall be
issued with all practicable secrecy, and the complaint, affidavit or testimony upon
which it is based shall not be filed with the clerk or made public in any way until the
search warrant is executed.”); In re United States, 10 F.3d 931, 941 (2d Cir. 1993)
(noting that “those subject to an arrest or search warrant have notice at the time the
intrusion occurs,” not before).
80
See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.
75
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houses, papers, and effects,”81 broad rights under the
Amendment protect a citizen’s own interests. Second, it gives
police a bright-line rule to follow. Officers would know “that the
authority to detain under Summers always dissipates once the
occupant of the residence [leaves].”82 Third, the balancing
approach appears to comport with the reasoning of the Summers
Court by refusing to extend Summers where its justifications do
not seem to apply.83
The Eighth and Tenth Circuits’ balancing approach has
many disadvantages, however. First, if the occupant of the
premises knows of the impending search, the police are unlikely
to be aware of his knowledge. Where an occupant in fact knows
of the warrant and is a flight risk, or will hide, destroy, or sell the
evidence of his crime, police will lose the evidence if the occupant
leaves the premises with it. Even where the occupant does not
know of the search warrant, but he leaves his property to sell it,
police would be kept from detaining the occupant and preventing
the loss of the evidence.84 Second, because the balancing test
turns on whether the occupant is aware of the warrant, police
might be encouraged to investigate to find whether the occupant
knows of the warrant. This investigation could lead to the kind
of dangers that Summers tried to combat, like a sudden outburst
of violence by an occupant who becomes aware that he is being
followed by police.85 Third, drawing a bright line at the premises’
curb would put officers in a difficult position: When police
witness an occupant “leaving a residence for which they have a
search warrant, they would be required either to detain him
immediately (risking officer safety and the destruction of
evidence) or to permit him to leave the scene (risking the
inability to detain him if incriminating evidence was
81

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
United States v. Bailey, 468 F. Supp. 2d 373, 379 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 652
F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013).
83
Edwards, 103 F.3d at 94; Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 346; see James A. Adams,
Search and Seizure as Seen by Supreme Court Justices: Are They Serious or Is This
Just Judicial Humor?, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 413, 444 (1993) (suggesting that
the dangers warned of in Summers may be “hypothetical and unrealistic” in some
cases); Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U.
PITT. L. REV. 227, 271 (1984).
84
See, e.g., Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 345–46 (“When the police conducted a search of
Sherrill at the station, they discovered 92.71 grams of crack in his underwear and
$740 on his person.”).
85
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981).
82
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discovered).”86 Fourth, requiring police to rush to detain the
occupant on the premises, even where police have reason to
believe that other occupants within the premises pose a risk of
destroying the evidence, would place any evidence that is still on
the property at risk.87 Finally, the Summers Court itself held
that although not all four of the law enforcement interests that it
cited were present in Summers, the importance of those
interests, even if they did not arise in the facts of a particular
case, justified the Court’s holding.88 According to the Court’s
decision, it should not matter whether the occupants are actually
aware of the search warrant.89
B.

The Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits’ “As Soon As
Practicable” Standard

The Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits use an “as
soon as practicable” standard in extending Summers to offpremises detainments.90 The standard, as stated by the Second
Circuit, is that “Summers imposes upon police a duty based on
both geographic and temporal proximity; police must identify an
individual in the process of leaving the premises subject to search
and detain him as soon as practicable during the execution of the
search.”91 There is no balancing of the Summers interests under
86

United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2011).
See United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 55 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The police could
assume that once alerted, the occupants might have disposed of the contraband by
the window or the toilet . . . .”).
88
See Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 (“Although no special danger to the police is
suggested by the evidence in this record, the execution of a warrant to search for
narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic
efforts to conceal or destroy evidence.”); Adams, supra note 83.
89
See Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 (noting the interests of preventing flight and
“minimizing the risk of harm to the officers”).
90
See Bailey, 652 F.3d at 206 (applying Summers where police detained the
defendant “as soon as practicable”); United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1011
(7th Cir. 2011) (holding that police “had the authority to detain Bullock during
execution of the search warrant; he was the subject of the officers’ investigation, had
just left the premises, [and] was pulled over as soon as reasonably practicable”);
United States v. Cavazos, 288 F.3d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying Summers to an
off-premises seizure and holding that “[t]he proximity between an occupant of a
residence and the residence itself may be relevant in deciding whether to apply
Summers, but it is by no means controlling”); United States v. Cochran, 939 F.2d
337, 339 (6th Cir. 1991) (ruling that the focus under Summers “is upon police
performance, that is, whether the police detained defendant as soon as practicable
after departing from his residence”).
91
Bailey, 652 F.3d at 206.
87

FINAL_TORREBLANCA

776

2/27/2014 6:31 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:763

this test because the courts assume that those interests are what
permit the seizure of the occupant.92 Instead, if police see the
occupant leaving his premises, they may detain him so long as
they do so as early as practicable.93
In each case within this group, the courts held that the offpremises seizure of an occupant was reasonable where the police
had a search warrant for the occupant’s premises and the police
witnessed the occupant leave the premises.94
The officers
95
stopped each occupant as early as practicable. In United States
v. Bailey, for example, police were outside the defendant’s home,
preparing to execute a search warrant that they had obtained
just over an hour earlier.96 The police watched the defendant get
into a car, but decided not to confront the defendant “within view
or earshot of the apartment.”97 Instead, the officers followed the
defendant’s car and pulled him over approximately one mile
away from his home.98 The officers explained that they did not
seize the defendant immediately because of “safety concerns,
particularly the desire to avoid alerting other individuals who
may have been in the apartment to the presence of law
enforcement.”99 Additionally, the officers stated that they waited
until the defendant drove about a mile before stopping him to
prevent other occupants or neighbors from seeing the stop and to
conduct the stop past an intersection and off of a crowded
street.100 The court held that the defendant’s seizure one mile
from his home was constitutional under Summers.101
Similarly, in United States v. Cochran, the Sixth Circuit held
that the police’s seizure of the defendant after the defendant had
driven a short distance away from his house was reasonable.102

92

See, e.g., id. at 205.
See, e.g., id. at 206.
94
See id. at 205; Bullock, 632 F.3d at 1007–08; Cavazos, 288 F.3d at 711;
Cochran, 939 F.2d at 339.
95
Bailey, 652 F.3d at 207; Bullock, 632 F.3d at 1011; Cavazos, 288 F.3d at 711;
Cochran, 939 F.2d at 339.
96
Bailey, 652 F.3d at 200. The police obtained a search warrant at 8:45 PM on
July 28, 2005, went to the premises, watched the defendant leave the property at
about 9:56 that same evening, and stopped him approximately five minutes later. Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 200 n.3.
99
Id. at 200 n.2.
100
Id. at 200 n.3.
101
Id. at 199.
102
United States v. Cochran, 939 F.2d 337, 338 (6th Cir. 1991).
93
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The court held that “police performance” was the relevant
inquiry, not whether the defendant was on or off his premises at
the time the police detained him.103 However, the court stated
that “this performance-based duty will normally, but not
necessarily, result in detention of an individual in close proximity
to his residence.”104
In United States v. Bullock, the Seventh Circuit stressed the
policies behind the Summers decision in ruling that the police’s
stop of the defendant, an occupant of the house to be searched
along with the defendant’s children ten to fifteen blocks from the
residence, was reasonable since the car was “pulled over as soon
as reasonably practicable.”105 The court ruled that when the
officers informed the defendant of the warrant, he became a
flight risk and a threat to the police’s safety in executing the
warrant.106 “The detention of [the] occupant [was] warranted
‘because the character of the additional intrusion caused by
detention [was] slight and because the justifications for detention
[were] substantial.’ ”107
Finally, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Cavazos, stated
that the defendant’s seizure two blocks away from his residence
was permissible because his “behavior immediately before the
detention and his connection to the house—as either occupant or
resident—provided the agents with ample justification to detain
him during the search.”108 Prior to the police executing the
search warrant, the defendant left the house in a truck, drove
toward the officers watching the residence, and peered inside the
officers’ vehicle.109 The police attempted to follow the defendant,
but the defendant turned his truck around so that “the two
vehicles were approaching” one another.110 Then, the truck
“crossed over into the officers’ lane, creating a sort of stand off,”
and the officers exited with guns drawn and detained the

103
Id. at 339 (holding that defendant’s attempt to distinguish Summers because
police stopped the Summers defendant while he was coming down his front steps,
while officers detained Cochran after he had left his property, was without merit).
104
Id.
105
United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1009, 1011 (7th Cir. 2011).
106
Id. at 1020.
107
Id. at 1018 (quoting Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005)).
108
United States v. Cavazos, 288 F.3d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 2002).
109
Id. at 708.
110
Id.
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defendant.111 The court noted that the proximity of the occupant
to his residence may be relevant, but it is not controlling.112
Seizing the occupant of the premises to be searched as early as
practicable and bringing him back to the residence does not
violate the occupant’s Fourth Amendment rights.113
The “as soon as practicable” standard of the Second, Fifth,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits has numerous advantages in
protecting the interests, outlined in Summers, of preventing the
occupant’s flight, minimizing the risk of harm to officers and
occupants, avoiding the destruction of evidence, and facilitating
an orderly search.114 First, this approach prevents the loss of
evidence by allowing the police to detain occupants who do or do
not exhibit any knowledge of a warrant, but nonetheless have
evidence on them that may be sold or discarded absent police
detaining the occupant.115 Second, because officers may detain
the occupant even though the occupant is initially unaware of the
warrant, officers will not feel inclined to investigate the occupant
before detaining him and thereby risk arousing suspicion.116
Avoiding alerting the occupant to the search or surveillance can
allow the police to keep the situation from turning violent,117
reduce the chance of the occupant fleeing,118 and prevent the
destruction of evidence. Third, allowing the police to detain the
occupant off premises prevents other occupants from seeing the
police.119 Alerting other occupants to law enforcement presence
again raises the risks of police safety, flight, and destruction or

111

Id.
Id. at 712.
113
See id. at 711.
114
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702–03 (1981).
115
See, e.g., United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1007 (7th Cir. 2011). After
police arrested the defendant based on probable cause established during the search
of his premises, they searched the defendant’s person and found an additional
“sixteen individually wrapped baggies of crack cocaine.” Id. at 1010. Had police not
detained the defendant off-premises pursuant to the search, the defendant may have
sold the drugs. See id.
116
See, e.g., Cavazos, 288 F.3d at 708. The defendant appeared to be aware that
police were conducting surveillance on him or his home, which led to a tense
situation where the officers and the defendant had a “stand off” and the officers
drew their weapons. Id.
117
See, e.g., id.
118
See Alschuler, supra note 83, at 270.
119
See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 200 n.2 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d,
133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013).
112
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concealment of evidence.120 Fourth, the “as soon as practicable”
standard provides police an opportunity to wait until they can
carry out the seizure of an occupant with minimal safety risks.121
Fifth, allowing the police to detain the occupant even after he
leaves the premises will facilitate the orderly completion of the
search and prevent unnecessary property damage.122 Sixth, the
occupant’s presence during the search, whether he was initially
seized on or off the premises, can protect the police from
unknown dangers like guard dogs that police would encounter
while conducting their search.123 Finally, given the Summers
Court’s holding that the facts in each case do not have to
implicate every law enforcement interest for the detainment of
an occupant of premises to be reasonable,124 these courts’
approach of not investigating whether every interest was in fact
at stake is consistent with Summers.125
There are, however, disadvantages to the “as soon as
practicable” standard. For one, allowing police to detain the
occupant of premises subject to a search warrant after the
occupant leaves the premises seems to be more intrusive on
Fourth Amendment rights than an on-premises detainment.126
Second, there is the possibility that police will “manipulate[] the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the search warrant
for defendant’s residence in order to create an opportunity to
search” the defendant or his vehicle.127 Finally, if the interests

120
See United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 55 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The police could
assume that once alerted, the occupants might have disposed of the contraband by
the window or the toilet, or might have precipitated violence.”).
121
See Bailey, 652 F.3d at 200 nn.2–3. The court found that “[t]he officers’
decision to wait until Bailey had driven out of view of the house to detain him out of
concern for their own safety . . . was, in the circumstances presented, reasonable and
prudent.” Id. at 206.
122
See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 703 (1981). Even the Eighth Circuit,
which declined to extend Summers to off-premises detentions, acknowledged that
such seizures can help officers conduct a search. See, e.g., United States v. Sherrill,
27 F.3d 344, 346 (8th Cir. 1994).
123
See United States v. Cochran, 939 F.2d 337, 338 (6th Cir. 1991).
124
See Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 (finding the detention of the occupant
reasonable “[a]lthough no special danger to the police [was] suggested by the
evidence in [the] record”).
125
See Bailey, 652 F.3d at 205.
126
Sherrill, 27 F.3d at 346.
127
See Cochran, 939 F.2d at 338. The Cochran court, however, found that the
police did not manipulate the search warrant for the defendant’s home to create an
opportunity to search the defendant’s car. Id. at 339.
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justifying the Summers decision are truly irrelevant in a
particular case, any detention under Summers would be
unjust.128
III. EXTENDING SUMMERS TO OFF-PREMISES DETENTIONS
This Part asserts that the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh
Circuits’ “as soon as practicable” standard, which extends
Summers where police detain an occupant as soon as practicable
after his departure from the premises, is the proper test, but
proposes more explicit guidance in applying it. Part III.A
suggests three factors that courts should look to in determining
whether police seized the occupant as early as practicable. Part
III.B contends that the policies underlying the Fourth
Amendment support extending Summers to off-premises
seizures. Part III.C asserts that the Summers holding and
rationale justify the “as soon as practicable” standard. Part
III.C.1 argues that an off-premises seizure, like the on-premises
seizure in Summers, is limited in its intrusiveness, and Part
III.C.2 maintains that the police interests cited by the Summers
Court are equally applicable to off-premises detainments.
A.

Factors in the “As Soon As Practicable” Evaluation

The circuit courts that applied the “as soon as practicable”
standard used the correct test for determining whether an offpremises Summers detention is constitutionally permissible, but
failed to adequately advise police and trial courts of what to look
for in evaluating the propriety of such a seizure. The courts
could have better ensured that off-premises detentions would be
minimally intrusive by explicitly declaring factors that would
weigh for or against a finding that police detained an occupant as
soon as practicable. These factors, implicit in the courts’
opinions, include the distance the occupant traveled before police
seized him, the time that elapsed before officers detained him,
and evidence that police manipulated the circumstances to
exploit the seizure.

128
See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 93–94 (10th Cir. 1996);
Adams, supra note 83; Alschuler, supra note 83.
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Courts should look to the distance the occupant traveled
prior to her detention.129 The nearer an occupant is to his home
when police detain his, the more likely a court will find that
police detained his as soon as practicable.130 While a few blocks
is acceptable,131 and a mile is permissible when police are
concerned about public safety,132 it is unlikely that a court would
find police detaining an occupant twenty miles from her home
constitutionally tolerable.133
Courts should also consider the time that passed between
the occupant leaving his premises and the police seizing him.134
A court will be more willing to hold that officers seized the
occupant as soon as practicable when they do not excessively
delay his detention.135 Police waiting five minutes before pulling
over the occupant is reasonable,136 but delaying an hour will
almost certainly be impermissible.137
Finally, courts should determine whether officers
manipulated the circumstances surrounding the seizure to
exploit it for illegitimate purposes.138 A court will more likely
find that police detained an occupant as soon as practicable if
there is no evidence that the officers exploited the detention.139
For instance, a detention will probably violate the Fourth
Amendment if police delay detaining the occupant only so they
can use the seizure as a springboard to search the defendant and

129
See Bailey, 652 F.3d at 206; Cochran, 939 F.2d at 339; 1 JOSEPH G. COOK,
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 3:8 (3d ed. 2011).
130
See Cochran, 939 F.2d at 339 (noting that detaining an occupant as soon as
practicable “will normally, but not necessarily, result in detention of an individual in
close proximity to his residence”); JOHN M. BURKOFF, SEARCH WARRANT LAW
DESKBOOK § 13:2 (2012).
131
See, e.g., United States v. Cavazos, 288 F.3d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 2002).
132
See Bailey, 652 F.3d at 200 n.3.
133
See Cochran, 939 F.2d at 339.
134
See Bailey, 652 F.3d at 206.
135
See id. (stating that “Summers imposes upon police a duty based
on . . . temporal proximity”).
136
See id. at 200.
137
See id. at 206 (noting that police have a “duty based on . . . temporal
proximity” and must detain occupants “as soon as practicable”).
138
See Cochran, 939 F.2d at 338–40 (analyzing whether it was the defendant’s
actions or the police’s actions that led to defendant’s detention).
139
See id. at 339.
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his car.140 Additionally, a seizure will likely be unreasonable
when officers attempt to embarrass the occupant by detaining
him only after he comes into wide public view.141
B.

Fourth Amendment Policies

The extension of Summers to allow an off-premises seizure of
an occupant whose premises are subject to search does not raise
the concern of the Fourth Amendment’s ban on “general
warrants.” A “general warrant, in which the name of the person
to be arrested was left blank . . . perpetuated the oppressive
practice of allowing the police to arrest . . . on suspicion.”142 In
Summers, the Supreme Court held that the detainment of an
occupant of premises that are being searched is constitutional in
part because of the existence of a search warrant, founded on
probable cause, for the premises.143 The Court found that
because the determination of probable cause to search is made by
a neutral and detached magistrate, “[t]he connection of an
occupant to [the home to be searched] gives the police officer an
easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that
suspicion of criminal activity justifies a detention of that
occupant.”144 Therefore, a proper Summers detainment, in which
the police detain the occupant of premises subject to a valid
search warrant, does not raise the dangers of “general warrants.”
Officers are not given unlimited discretion to arrest who they
please, based on mere suspicion, but are given the “limited
authority” to detain the occupant of the premises while they
conduct a search.145 Whether the occupant of the premises is
detained on or off the premises while the search is conducted is
irrelevant, because it is his “connection” to the premises for
which there is probable cause to search that allows the police to
detain him.146 Accordingly, the police detaining an occupant as
soon as practicable after they witness him leaving his property
does not implicate the issue of the Fourth Amendment’s

140

See id.
See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981) (citing the seizure’s
minimal “public stigma” as support that its intrusiveness is limited).
142
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959).
143
Summers, 452 U.S. at 703.
144
Id. at 703–04.
145
Id. at 705.
146
See id. at 703–04; COOK, supra note 129.
141
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protection against “general warrants” since the police are still
basing their seizure of the occupant on his connection to his
premises.147
C.

Summers’ Policies

1.

The Seizure’s Limited Intrusiveness

Of key importance to the Summers Court was the limited
intrusiveness of the seizure involved in detaining an occupant of
premises that are being searched.148 The Court stated that the
seizure was “surely less intrusive than the search itself.”149 This
reasoning applies equally when the defendant has already
departed the premises.150 The Summers Court ruled that the fact
that the defendant was leaving his premises when he was
detained was not of constitutional significance.151 “The seizure of
respondent on the sidewalk outside was no more intrusive than
the detention of those residents of the house whom the police
found inside.”152 The Court found that the location of the
occupant at the time of seizure does not matter since the
invasiveness of the search will still outweigh that of the
seizure.153 Therefore, the intrusion on an occupant’s liberty when
he is detained off premises is still less than the invasion involved
in the search itself.154
Additionally, the Summers Court stated that, in contrast to a
custodial interrogation and arrest, the seizure of an occupant of
premises during a police search is “ ‘substantially less
intrusive.’ ”155 Such a seizure, whether on the premises or off, is
the same—police detain the occupant on his premises while they

147
See United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1019 (7th Cir. 2011); BURKOFF,
supra note 130.
148
See Summers, 452 U.S. at 701–02.
149
Id. at 701.
150
United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct.
1031 (2013) (“The guiding principle behind the requirement of reasonableness for
detention in such circumstances is the de minimis intrusion characterized by a brief
detention in order to protect the interests of law enforcement in the safety of the
officers and the preservation of evidence.”).
151
Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 n.16.
152
Id.
153
See id.
154
See id.
155
Id. at 702 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979)).
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conduct their search.156 Accordingly, the same reasoning applies
to on-premises and off-premises seizures. Like the on-premises
seizure in Summers, an off-premises seizure is not likely to be
exploited or prolonged since the information that police seek will
probably be obtained through the search of the premises and not
the seizure of the occupant.157 Police are still forbidden from
searching the occupant until independent probable cause is
established.158 Further, no matter where the initial seizure takes
place, because the detention is in the occupant’s own home, “it
could add only minimally to the public stigma associated with the
search itself and would involve neither the inconvenience nor the
indignity associated with a compelled visit to the police
station.”159 Additionally, evidence that police exploited the offpremises detention would weigh against a court finding that
police detained the occupant as early as practicable, and the
seizure would likely be invalid for failing the “as soon as
practicable” standard.160
The intrusiveness of a valid offpremises Summers detention is still far less than that of an
arrest and custodial interrogation.
2.

The Law Enforcement Interests’ Continuing Relevance

The four substantial law enforcement interests that justified
the Summers Court’s holding—preventing flight in the event that
police find incriminating evidence, minimizing the risk of harm
to police and occupants, averting the hiding or destruction of
evidence, and enabling the efficient completion of the search161—
remain important regardless of where the occupant is first
seized.162 “While the Eighth and Tenth circuits apparently
concluded that once an occupant leaves a premises subject to
search without knowledge of the warrant, Summers is
156
See, e.g., id. at 701; United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1019 (7th Cir.
2011) (holding that because the defendant “was detained for thirty or forty minutes
at a residence he had just left and had visited on multiple occasions,” the police’s
“interests in detaining him during the search were not outweighed by [the] rather
limited intrusion on his freedom”).
157
See Summers, 452 U.S. at 701; COOK, supra note 129 (stating that courts
have disapproved of interrogations conducted during Summers detentions).
158
See Summers, 452 U.S. at 705.
159
Id. at 702.
160
See supra notes 139–41 and accompanying text.
161
Summers, 452 U.S. at 702–03.
162
See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133
S. Ct. 1031 (2013).
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inapplicable because” the law enforcement interests no longer
apply; “it is the very interests at stake in Summers that permit
detention of an occupant nearby, but outside, of the premises.”163
The Eighth and Tenth Circuits’ balancing approach to offpremises detainments would force police into a Hobson’s choice of
electing to either rush in to detain the occupant before he leaves
the premises, endangering the officers’ safety and risking the
destruction of the evidence, or allow the occupant to leave the
scene, forfeiting the ability to detain the occupant if
incriminating evidence is found.164 Allowing officers to detain the
occupant “as soon as practicable” provides them with the ability
to “ ‘exercise unquestioned command of the situation’ ” at the
moment when the Summers Court recognizes that “they most
need it.”165
The “as soon as practicable” approach furthers the first law
enforcement interest stated by the Summers Court: preventing
flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found.166 The
“as soon as practicable” standard, unlike the Eighth and Tenth
Circuits’ balancing approach, does not require that the occupant
have knowledge of the warrant before police may constitutionally
seize him.167
Therefore, courts applying the “as soon as
practicable” standard avoid the risk of alerting the occupant that
he is being followed or investigated because police may detain the
occupant without having to discover whether he knows of the
warrant.168 Police are permitted to detain the occupant before
they arouse his suspicions, preventing him from becoming a
flight risk.169
The “as soon as practicable” standard protects the Summers
Court’s second policy interest underlying its holding: minimizing
the risk of harm to officers and occupants.170 First, because police
do not have to explore whether the occupant has knowledge of
the warrant and do not risk alerting the occupant of their

163

Id.
Id. at 205–06.
165
See id. (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 703); BURKOFF, supra note 130.
166
Summers, 452 U.S. at 702.
167
See Bailey, 652 F.3d at 205.
168
See id.
169
See United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1014 (7th Cir. 2011) (stating
that the government has a “strong interest in detaining Bullock to prevent flight
while they conducted their search”); Alschuler, supra note 83, at 270.
170
Summers, 452 U.S. at 702–03.
164
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presence,171 officers are less likely to cause the occupant to erupt
violently.172 Second, officers can avoid alerting other occupants of
their presence by detaining the occupant away from the
premises.173 It is reasonable to assume that seizing an occupant
outside of his home might risk the officers’ safety.174 Similarly,
the police’s ability to wait until it is practicable before detaining
the occupant allows them to better protect the public from harm
by stopping and seizing the occupant in a low-traffic area.175
Finally, police detaining and bringing back the occupant before
conducting the search shields the police from unknown dangers,
such as guard dogs.176
The “as soon as practicable” standard aids police in
preventing the concealment, loss, or destruction of evidence, the
third interest cited by the Summers Court.177 Unlike under the
balancing approach, police may prevent the loss of evidence by
detaining occupants who do or do not demonstrate awareness of a
warrant, but who are carrying evidence that they can sell or
discard.178 The police are better able to prevent the loss of
evidence by detaining the occupant before he is able to dispose of
it in some way.179 Similarly, since police may detain the occupant
after he leaves the premises, they can avoid alerting other
occupants of the residence that police have an interest in the
premises.180
This protects law enforcement interests by
preventing the other occupants’ destruction or concealment of the
evidence.181
The “as early as practicable” approach advances the final law
enforcement interest identified by the Summers Court:
facilitating the orderly completion of the search of the

171

See Bailey, 652 F.3d at 205.
See Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 (stating that “the execution of a warrant to
search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden
violence”).
173
Bailey, 652 F.3d at 200 n.2.
174
Id. at 206; see United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 55 (2d Cir. 2000).
175
See Bailey, 652 F.3d at 200 n.3.
176
See United States v. Cochran, 939 F.2d 337, 338 (6th Cir. 1991).
177
Summers, 452 U.S. at 702.
178
See, e.g., United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1007–08, 1011 (7th Cir.
2011).
179
See Summers, 452 U.S. at 702; BURKOFF, supra note 130.
180
Bailey, 652 F.3d at 200 n.2.
181
See id. at 206; United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 55 (2d Cir. 2000).
172
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premises.182 Officers detaining the occupant and returning him
to his home will help police complete the search smoothly and
efficiently, minimizing the unnecessary destruction of property.183
The occupant has a self-interest in opening locked doors and
containers.184 This holds true regardless of where the occupant is
first seized.185
VI. THE SUPREME COURT’S INADEQUATE SOLUTION IN BAILEY V.
UNITED STATES
This Part addresses the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Bailey v. United States.186 Part IV.A discusses the Court’s
rejection of the “as soon as practicable” standard in favor of a
rule grounded in the “immediate vicinity” of the premises being
searched. Part IV.B asserts that the Supreme Court’s new
standard is flawed and proposes that the issue be revisited.
A.

The Bailey v. United States Holding

In early 2013, the Supreme Court, in a six to three decision,
rejected the Second Circuit’s application of the “as soon as
practicable” standard.187 The Court instead adopted a test that
permits Summers detentions only when they occur within the
“immediate vicinity” of the property being searched.188 The Court
discussed several factors to decide whether police detained an
occupant within the “immediate vicinity” of his home, “including
the lawful limits of the premises, whether the occupant was
within the line of sight of his dwelling, the ease of reentry from
the occupant’s location, and other relevant factors.”189
The Supreme Court declined to extend Summers to offpremises seizures because it found that such seizures do not
implicate the law enforcement interests underlying the Summers

182

Summers, 452 U.S. at 702–03.
Id. at 703; see COOK, supra note 129.
184
Summers, 452 U.S. at 703.
185
See, e.g., United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Sherrill, 27 F.3d 344, 346 (8th Cir. 1994).
186
133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013).
187
Id. at 1042.
188
Id. at 1041 (“The categorical authority to detain incident to the execution of a
search warrant must be limited to the immediate vicinity of the premises to be
searched.”).
189
Id. at 1042.
183
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decision.190
First, the Court stated that the concern of
minimizing the risk of harm to the officers conducting the search
is not triggered because the occupant ceases to pose a risk when
he leaves the property.191 Second, the Court dismissed the
interest in the suspect facilitating the search since, under the
facts of the case, the suspect was unwilling to cooperate and the
search had been completed by the time he was brought back to
his apartment.192
Third, the Court stated that the law
enforcement interest in preventing flight when police find
incriminating evidence is not raised by off-premises suspects
because these suspects do not jeopardize the “integrity of the
search.”193 In sum, the Court refused to apply Summers because
it found the justifications underpinning the rule lacking in offpremises detentions.194
B.

Bailey v. United States Should Be Revisited

The “immediate vicinity” rule that the Supreme Court
articulated in Bailey invites uncertainty into Summers detention
cases. Additionally, the Court’s rationale fails to account for
serious law enforcement concerns. Accordingly, the Court should
revisit its Bailey holding.
In Bailey, the Court attempted to establish a simple rule
that defines when Summers detentions are permissible: Seizures
are tolerable if they occur within the “immediate vicinity” of the
property to be searched.195 However, the factors delineated by
the Court—“the lawful limits of the premises, whether the
occupant was within the line of sight of his dwelling, [and] the
ease of reentry from the occupant’s location”196—will not
consistently provide a logical answer to whether a seizure was
permissible. For instance, if a suspect whose home is about to be
searched steps off of his property and reaches the street before
being seized, will the detention be valid? The answer would seem
190
Id. at 1041 (“In sum, of the three law enforcement interests identified to
justify the detention in Summers, none applies with the same or similar force to the
detention of recent occupants beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises to be
searched.”).
191
Id. at 1038–39.
192
Id. at 1040.
193
Id. at 1040–41.
194
Id. at 1041.
195
See id. at 1042.
196
Id.
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to be yes, even though the occupant left his property, because he
likely still has a line of sight to the property and could easily
reenter it. On the other hand, what about a suspect who lives in
an apartment building and enters the stairwell next to his room
before police seize him? Even though he would probably be closer
to the premises than the other suspect and would therefore pose
a greater danger to police, his seizure would likely be found
impermissible; he was off of his property and did not have a line
of sight to it.
The three-prong “as soon as practicable” standard that this
Note proposes197 would not carry the same shortfall of illogical
application. Under this Note’s test, both of the seizures described
above would be permissible, provided that police witnessed the
suspect leaving the premises. Both detentions would satisfy the
prongs of the “as soon as practicable” standard: The occupants
were seized (1) near their property, (2) shortly after their
detention, and (3) the circumstances surrounding the seizures
were not manipulated by the police.198 Rather than treating
similar circumstances differently, as the Court’s new Bailey
analysis would, this Note’s approach would yield consistent
results across parallel circumstances.
In addition to the “immediate vicinity” rule’s problems, the
Bailey Court unduly downplayed the significance of the Summers
interests for off-premises seizures.199 First, the interest in
minimizing the risk of harm to police does not disappear when
the occupant leaves the premises. For example, “the police do not
know whether an emerging individual has seen an officer. If he
has, . . . those inside may learn of imminent police entry and fire
the gun.”200 Second, the concern of facilitating the orderly
completion of the search is the same regardless of where police
detain the occupant.201 Third, the interest in preventing flight
“will be present in all Summers detentions” since “any occupant
departing a residence containing contraband will have incentive
to flee once he encounters police.”202 It is naïve to contend that

197
198
199
200
201
202

See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.A.
Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1046–47 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see supra Part III.C.2.
Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1048; see supra Part III.C.2.
Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1047; see supra Part III.C.2.
Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1046–47; see supra Part III.C.2.
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the law enforcement interests supporting the Summers doctrine
dissipate when the suspect leaves the immediate vicinity of his
home. As Justice Breyer forcefully reasoned:
Consider why the officers here waited until the occupants had
left the block to stop them: They did so because the occupants
might have been armed.
Indeed, even if those emerging occupants were not armed (and
even if the police knew it), those emerging occupants might
have seen the officers outside the house. And they might have
alerted others inside the house where, as we now know (and the
officers had probable cause to believe), there was a gun lying on
the floor in plain view. Suppose those inside the house, once
alerted, had tried to flee with the evidence. Suppose they had
destroyed the evidence. Suppose that one of them had picked
up the gun and fired when the officers entered. Suppose that an
individual inside the house (perhaps under the influence of
drugs) had grabbed the gun and begun to fire through the
window, endangering police, neighbors, or families passing
by.203

Because of the dangers to the community that the Court’s
test invites, Bailey will likely not be the end of this story.
CONCLUSION
Rather than using a balancing approach in determining
whether the seizure of the occupant of premises subject to a
search warrant is reasonable after the occupant leaves the
premises, the Michigan v. Summers holding should be extended
so long as police detained the occupant “as early as practicable”
after seeing the occupant leave the premises. Factors courts
should look to in applying the “as early as practicable” standard
are the proximity between the occupant’s home and his place of
seizure, the amount of time that elapsed between the occupant’s
departure and his detention, and whether police exploited the
seizure. Off-premises, compared to on-premises, detainments of
occupants pose no substantial additional intrusion on their
Fourth Amendment rights. Additionally, the law enforcement
interests underlying the Summers holding of preventing flight,
protecting police safety, avoiding the concealment or destruction
of evidence, and facilitating the search justify the application of
Summers where an occupant has left the premises and the police
203

Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1047–48 (citations omitted).
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detained him as early as practicable. Police detention of an
occupant during the execution of a search warrant is surely
justified where the defendant is “the subject of the officers’
investigation, ha[s] just left the premises, [is] pulled over as soon
as reasonably practicable, and . . . [is] a flight risk and pose[s] a
potential danger to the officers conducting the search.”204 The
defendant’s detention is “warranted because the additional
intrusion caused by detention [is] slight and the justifications
[are] substantial.”205

204
205

United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1011 (2011).
Id.

